Earlier attempts at providing Ukraine with Poland's and Bulgaria's MiG-29s failed to come to fruition, presumably because such a delivery was judged too (politically) risky and cumbersome, especially when compared with the more simple (and politically safer) delivery of ground-based assets such as ATGMs and MANPADS. It's also possible that Poland likewise views the delivery of MiG-29s to Ukraine as excess to Ukraine's actual defensive needs. Combined with the fact that the Polish Air Force would quickly have to find replacements for the air defence capabilities lost by transferring its MiG-29s as tensions with Russia are at an all time high, it is no large surprise that the delivery never materialised.

The same considerations affect Slovakia, which has previously indicated that donation of its MiG-29s is only possible when guarantees are given that its airspace would still be protected after losing its entire fighter aircraft capability (at least until 2023). Such a guarantee could be realised by having the Polish or Czech Air Force take over Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) duties for Slovakia, or by temporarily stationing NATO aircraft in Slovakia to provide air policing duties instead.

If a transfer does take place, the aircraft will likely be stationed on air bases in Western Ukraine. Their dispersal and frequent relocation around the air base could significantly increase their survivability, and thereby force Russia to increase its current efforts to ground the Ukrainian Air Force. As Russia has still failed to do so after two months of war, there is little indication that they would soon be successful. Though the concrete contribution in terms of enemy equipment destroyed may not be substantial, the mere fact that the opposing side will need to adjust its operations to prevent losses can have a very real effect on the situation on the ground.

In terms of logistics and existing knowledge base, the potential Slovakian delivery would probably be the most realistic plan for air assets to be delivered to Ukraine so far. With pilots already trained on the type, and commonality of weaponry and infrastructure, a smooth transition into Ukrainian Air Force service is likely. This is true not in small part because the delivery can be expected to concern no more than a handful of aircraft, making their integration straightforward, but their potential impact limited.In this sense, the symbolism and heartening effect these aircraft can convey might well outstrip their actual combat efficacy.

 

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Six weeks into Russia's invasion of Ukraine it can be argued that the full array of issues affecting the Russian military and its operational planning have been laid bare. Setting out to first seize Kyiv within days in order to have a strong position in negotiations with the West about the future status of Ukraine in exchange for a reduction of sanctions, it suddenly finds itself a month past that deadline with meagre territorial gains, an army in tatters and severe reputational damage, not to mention an economy buckling under some of the heaviest sanctions ever instated on a nation. [1]

By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer

 

In a conflict that is shaping up to be one of the most intense and rapidly developing of our time, drones have come to play an increasingly important role, and could well end up being one of the pivotal factors in its eventual conclusion. Thus, the delivery of at least 16 additional Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs, on top of the 18 already in Ukraine's pre-war inventory, constitutes perhaps one of the most significant instances of support to Ukraine's plight yet. [1] Now evidence has emerged that Turkey's drone contributions have not remained limited to the TB2, with new combat footage of Baykar's Mini-Bayraktar UAV confirming their delivery to the country. [2]

 

With modern U.S., Chinese and Turkish UCAVs already operationally deployed in a multitude of nations and conflicts worldwide, Russia has been notably lagging behind in the development and production of such drones. Favouring instead (manned) attack helicopters like the Ka-52 and Mi-28(N) to perform strike missions while loitering over the battlefield, they adhere to a doctrine that disregards the UCAV's carefully executed reconnaissance and strike operations for more aggressive search and assault missions. Each new conflict of the modern age seems to showcase the merit of the UCAV to greater detail however, and Russia has thus increasingly opted to invest in the concept as well.